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Canada-U.S. Trade Options: A View from the Canadian Side
by W. A. Dymond*

Good fences make good neighbors, Robert Frost teaches us. A month

after Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan adopted a Declaration on Trade at their Quebec meeting, it is timely to offer a view
from the Canadian side of the fence concerning the opportunities and
options that lie before us for changing the way the bilateral trading relationship is conducted.
When this Conference was organized, the theme of sectoral integration, and negotiations that lead in that direction, was a well chosen topic
for serious public discussion. It still is. Indeed, it is the sectoral approach and the positive response it engendered on both sides which has
been the launch pad for a broader and more profound examination of
new approaches to govern this most important trading relationship.
In January, the Canadian government published How to Secure and
Enhance CanadianAccess to Export Markets: A Discussion Paper,as the
basis for extensive public consultations covering both a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations and options for Canada-U.S. trade inclusive of the sectoral approach. The work program and timetables for action established by the Quebec Declaration, and the outcome of
consultations on the Discussion Paper, will lead to important decisions in
the months ahead. Conferences such as the present one can make a valuable contribution to public debate.
In Canada, serious discussion of trade policy starts with some fundamental factors which, for us, are as enduring as the cold weather
which sweeps from the north every year to make headlines on American
news. These factors govern our view of the trading world and define our
options. The first factor is the size of our home market, 25 million people, that is by far the smallest of all the major industrialized trading
countries. Our three principal trading partners: the U.S., the European
Community and Japan, have domestic markets of roughly 240, 330 and
100 million or more.
In North American terms, the Canadian market has been, throughout most of its history, one tenth of the U.S. market. For example, in
1911, the last time an agreement providing for the elimination of bilateral
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trade barriers was publicly debated in Canada, our population was some
9 million compared to 90 million in the United States. What this small
market means is that for Canada, in contrast to the United States, the
options of looking inward for our prosperity or working for a consumer
led recovery to lead us out of recessions, are luxuries denied. In the
words of the Canadian Government's Trade Policy Review of 1983:
"Canada's population will remain too small, and its industrial productive
capacity too specialized, to permit a significant reduction in foreign trading activity without severely reducing the Canadian standard of living."
If the smallness of the market relative to the U.S. has been an enduring fact of life, the rapid growth of the share of trade in the national
income has brought home to Canadians how important open markets are
to production and employment. A few years ago, trade accounted for
under 20% of national income; it now approaches one third of the total.
This compares with 10% for the U.S. and 15% for Japan.
Every indication, in a world of rapidly changing competitive pressures and comparative advantage, points to a continually rising trend in
the share of trade in our national income. There is hardly a sector or
region of the country that does not depend upon a strong trade performance for growth and employment. These face major disruption when our
competitive edge sags, or markets are restricted or closed. Some three
million jobs, more than a quarter of the Canadian work force, depend
upon trade. The Economic Council of Canada has calculated that every
billion dollars of exports translates into nearly 16,000 jobs.
Canada is, of course, not the only country with a small domestic
market and a high dependence upon exports. Economies such as the
Netherlands and Norway have smaller markets and reach considerably
higher figures of trade dependence. Among larger countries, West Germany's trade dependence at some 32% exceeds that of Canada. However, these countries enjoy relatively unfettered access to export markets
either through membership in the European Community or by means of
trade agreements with it.
A second factor is the composition of Canadian trade. Economic
students of a previous generation broke their teeth on Harold Innis' seminal studies of the fur trade in Canada. Aspiring trade policy officers of
15 to 20 years ago came to grips and attempted to master trade and trade
policies in wheat, forest products, metals and minerals.
In the 1980's, Canada retains comparative advantage in world markets for resource based products at various stages of processing. However, world market prospects for resource products are for slow growth
with over-capacity and new competition. For example, in agriculture the
pursuit of self-sufficiency policies in major importing countries, the entry
of new exporters, and the shortages of foreign exchange in developing
and centrally-planned economies, may continue to have a dampening effect on world market prospects. In metals and minerals, Canadian producers are, on the one hand, frequently competing against new materials
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and products. On the other hand they are confronted by competition
from developing countries which often have lower costs, receive development assistance and, in some cases, enjoy preferential access to developed
country markets. While the Canadian resource endowment retains the
potential to provide a solid basis for prosperity in the future, it is no
longer the automatic meal ticket that it once appeared to be.
The final factor to underline, in presenting the view from the Canadian side of the fence, is the shift in Canada's export picture in terms of
market concentration and market opportunities. The United States has
become overwhelmingly our most important export market-almost
75% of total sales. Canadian exports to the U.S., including those under
the AutoPact, are fourteen times our exports to our next most important
market. The growth in the U.S. market for Canadian exports in 1984
was more than the total of our exports to Europe and Japan. Virtually
the whole breadth and range of Canadian production, in all regions of
Canada, are involved in exports to the U.S.
We are, at the same time, the U.S.'s most important market, accounting for 20% of U.S. exports. In 1983 U.S. exports to Canada were
(Can)$66.3 billion, more than Japan at $55 billion and four times as
much as U.S. exports to Germany and the U.K. While Canadian exports
to the U.S. have been rapidly rising, there has been a steady decline in
our traditional markets in Western Europe. In the early 1960's, Western
Europe accounted for 25% of our total exports, concentrated in the agricultural and primary resource industries area. This figure has declined to
8%, and slow economic growth in Europe suggests that this region offers
only modest potential.
New markets in Asia and the Pacific have opened for Canada. This
region has the fastest economic growth rate in the world and now represents Canada's most rapidly growing export market, second to the U.S.
Whatever bilateral options may be adopted in Canada-U.S. trade, the
government will attach high priority to the Pacific Rim. Canada, like the
U.S., faces the challenge of increasing its competitiveness if the immense
opportunities of the Pacific are to be exploited.
It is these considerations which lead Canadians to a continuous preoccupation with the country's trade performance and with devising the
best mix of policies and bilateral and multilateral trade relationships to
improve that performance. Throughout the course of our history, this
preoccupation has led us time and time again to a hard look at our trading relationship with the United States. The proximity, the depth and
breadth of our bilateral trade, and the sheer volumes of the cross-border
trade, required us to have that trading relationship be the first order of
business for Canadian trade policy.
In each of the seven rounds of mutilateral trade negotiations since
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was established thirty-eight
years ago, the Canada-U.S. dimension has been the largest and the most
critical part of the negotiations for Canada. Over this period, both coun-
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tries have concentrated their efforts on constructing, improving, and
shoring up the multilateral trading system. What is new is a disposition
to consider whether a bilateral agreement which goes beyond the obligations exchanged in the GATT would serve our mutual interests and can
be negotiated in a reasonable time.
When the present Canadian government came to office last September, one of its first decisions was to engage in a broad and intensive series
of public consultations on a range of issues including Canadian trade. In
its Economic and Fiscal Statement last November, the government undertook to "examine . . . in close consultation with the provinces and
the private sector all avenues to secure and enhance market access." The
result of that commitment was the Discussion Paper mentioned above.
The preeminent theme of the paper is security of access to world
markets. One reason for the choice of such a theme is the success of
seven rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. Indeed, tariffs have been
reduced to a level where-compared to rapid and unpredictable changes
in exchange rates-they are no longer the significant barrier to trade that
they were even ten to fifteen years ago. In 1987, when the last of the
Tokyo Round of tariff cuts are made, over 80% of Canadian exports to
the United States and 65% of U.S. exports to Canada will be free of
customs duty. However, Canadian producers of petrochemicals will still
face high rates of 15% in the United States and American exporters face
significant tariff obstacles in rubber and footwear in Canada. While a
bilateral agenda, focused on tariffs alone, would present a challenging
task for negotiators, it is clear that there would be little enthusiasm on
either side for such an exclusive course of action.
A second and more important reason is the vulnerability of Canadian exports-and the production and employment which depend upon
them-to protectionist forces of growing magnitude and effectiveness.
There is a proliferating range of non-tariff barriers to trade, an imposing
battery of contingency protection remedies, and an increasingly aggressive, sometimes whimsical, involvement of Congress in changing unilaterally the conditions of access to the U.S. market. These protectionist
pressures, whether fueled by trade deficits or difficult bilateral relationships with other countries, jeopardize the accomplishments of the past
and have led our governments to consider anew their options.
It is an axiom of trade policy that you either go forward or backward. Inertia is no option. This axiom applies not only to trade in
goods, where international disciplines embodied in the GAIT exist, but
also to areas such as services, where such rules have not been formulated
or widely accepted in a contractually binding way. Against this background, the Discussion Paper sets out four options for consideration
under the heading of Canada-U.S. trade relations.
One is to continue as we have in the past. The Canadian response to
the protectionist threats of the last two to three years has been the invocation of Canadian rights under the GATT, combined with a coordi-
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nated and integrated effort designed to bring home to U.S. interests our
mutual stake in maintaining market access. In one case, specialty steel,
Canada availed itself of its GATT rights to take action against U.S. exports to Canada when the U.S., under its emergency safeguard legislation, imposed restrictions on Canadian exports. In other cases, notably
the threat against carbon steel in 1984, Canadian efforts emphasized U.S.
exports to Canada of coal and iron ore, and we are pleased that Canada
has not been asked to accept voluntary export restraints.
The Discussion Paper observes that while there is clearly scope to
step up these efforts and buttress them with an improved early warning
system, the status quo in bilateral trade relations may not adequately
serve Canadian economic interests with the U.S. in a tougher international environment.
A second approach would be to negotiate agreements limited to sectors or non-tariff trade measures. The scope of such arrangements would
go beyond existing GATT rules and agreements in terms of secured and
enhanced market access. Two agreements of the sectoral type already
exist with the U.S.: The Canada-U.S. Defense Production Sharing Arrangement and the AutoPact. The former provides for virtually unrestricted trade in defense products; the latter provides for tariff-free
trade for new automobiles and most original parts, subject on the Canadian side to certain production and value-added safeguards and a limitation of rights to duty-free access to designated importers.
The sector initiative, launched by Canada in 1983, was aimed at the
careful examination of the scope for agreements in individual sectors.
Four were identified initially for study: steel, urban transit equipment,
agricultural inputs and equipment, and informatics. The motivation for
the first three was improved and more secure access to the U.S. market:
in the case of steel, to negotiate not only the removal of U.S. and Canadian tariffs but, more importantly from the Canadian perspective, a contractually binding exclusion from protectionist tariff increases or import
quotas; in urban transit, to obtain the removal of "Buy American" preferences; and, in agricultural inputs and equipment, to extend the scope
and enhance the security of existing tariff-free trade. A number of other
sectors were proposed for examination but the concentration of attention
throughout last year was upon these four.
In the non-tariff area, the Discussion Paper suggests that negotiations could specifically address government procurement or contingency
protection measures such as emergency safeguards. For example, would
it be possible to establish mutual exemptions from measures of general
application aimed primarily at disruptive imports from third parties?
Any limited approach presents issues of balance and symmetry.
Sectoral arrangements would need to be perceived by the industries of
both countries as mutually advantageous. There would be no crosssectoral tradeoffs, thus limiting the scope of the exercise and the negotiating parameters.
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In the non-tariff area, an important question is how an appropriate
balance of advantages could be struck between those industries which
would benefit from such arrangements and those which would face increased import competition. An important question is whether sufficient
political and private sector support could be mustered for individual
agreements on a step-by-step basis, or whether a comprehensive approach would better ensure positive results.
Another relevant consideration is an examination of the limited arrangements in the GATT. The most-favored-nation (MFN) obligation
of the GATT requires members of the organization to extend the same
conditions of access, with respect to duties and non-tariff barriers, to all
members of the organization. It is unlikely that limited arrangements in
any great number could be negotiated which could be so extended to all
GATT members or otherwise made compatible with the GATT. The
Discussion Paper makes clear that the GATT is the cornerstone of Canadian trade policy and any bilateral arrangements would need to be
brought into conformity with it.
A third approach would be to negotiate a comprehensive arrangement. A comprehensive agreement which provided for the removal of
tariffs and non-tariff barriers on substantially all bilateral trade would
conform with the GATT requirements. Implementation would require
Congressional and Parliamentary approval of the agreement and action
to implement the changes in existing legislation ensuing from the
arrangement.
This would be a challenging and complex agenda, requiring consideration of the scope for the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers according to a multi-year schedule on substantially all the trade between
Canada and the United States. Among the approaches for Canada-U.S.
arrangements outlined in the Discussion Paper, only the comprehensive
approach would induce substantial structural adjustment in the Canadian economy-as firms adapted to economies of scale and specialization, to increased production, and to more intense competition from
imports.
If it were decided to initiate negotiations for a comprehensive agreement, there would exist considerable flexibility on several issues: the nature and the duration of the transitional period for the removal of trade
barriers; the exclusion of certain product categories; contingency protection; the question of domestic subsidization; and the treatment of trade
restrictions maintained by provinces and states. In addition, it would be
open to Canada and the U.S. to negotiate provisions on matters which do
not themselves fall under the GATT, for example, trade in services or
rules relating to investment.
An important question would be the manner in which the agreement would be managed. In particular, the principles and procedures for
the resolution of disputes on matters covered by the agreement would
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need to be carefully stipulated, bearing in mind the disparity in the relative bargaining weights of Canada and the U.S.
A comprehensive approach would affect only the barriers maintained on Canada-U.S. trade. It would leave untouched the respective
trade barriers maintained against third countries. It would not provide
for the free flow of capital and labor as in a common market. Nor would
an arrangement necessarily entail changes in other policies which affect
trade, such as monetary policies, taxation, labor, regional development,
investment or competition. It could, however, accentuate the pressure in
Canada that is inherent in the close Canada-U.S. economic relationship-to ensure that Canadian policies in these and other areas did not
place Canadian producers at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the U.S.
The last approach proposed for public discussion-with the observation that this list of four options is neither exclusive or conclusive-is a
framework agreement. By such an agreement the two governments
would establish objectives for the improvement and expansion of commercial and economic relations and the reduction and removal of bilateral trade barriers. An institutional mechanism such as a Trade
Consultative Committee could be created to address the issues under discussion and negotiation.
A framework agreement would demonstrate the political importance attached by both governments to the trade relationship, through
the establishment of principles, procedures, and mechanisms for the
management of trade issues. Since there would be no immediate changes
to current legislation, a framework agreement could be entered into
quickly without reference to Congress. Being essentially declaratory and
non-contractual in nature, it would not in itself provide more secure and
enhanced access to the Canadian or U.S. market.
The Discussion Paper is careful to point out that a framework agreement could give rise to expectations which could only be realized
through substantive negotiations involving reciprocal commitments on
market access. The risk is that negotiating of a framework agreement by
itself could be time-consuming without yielding concrete measures; and,
that time may not be available.
The consultations conducted by the Minister for International
Trade take the form of open public meetings, less formal but with the
same purpose as the hearing process in the United States. The results of
these consultations will be discussed with the Canadian provinces, and a
report made to Cabinet. The question of the direction of future CanadaU.S. trade arrangements, and the determination of the best choice among
the options available, rests ultimately on an assessment of the importance
of barriers to Canadian access identified in the consultations; the advantages and risks of each option; the negotiability of defined objectives; and,
the political will of both governments to undertake such negotiations.
Between the Discussion Paper and the Declaration on Trade
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adopted at Quebec on March 19, there is a clear fit. The Canadian Minister for International Trade and the United States Trade Representative
have received a mandate "to chart all possible ways to reduce and eliminate existing barriers to trade and to report (to the Prime Minister and
the President) within six months." In addition, special action is being
taken on a range of special issues including government procurement, air
transport, intellectual property, energy, and cooperation in high technology. On April 19th, Minister Kelleher and the newly nominated Trade
Representative Clayton Yeutter met in Chicago for what will be several
meetings on how to discharge the Quebec mandate.
Beyond these bilateral initiatives, both governments have repeatedly
made clear-most recently in the Quebec Trade Declaration and in the
OECD Ministerial meeting-the importance of an early beginning to a
new roun4 of multilateral trade negotiations. It needs to be emphasized
that what is at issue is not a choice between bilateral and multilateral
approaches to trade liberalization. The stakes that both countries have in
a strengthened multilateral trading system and multilateral trade liberalization on the broadest possible basis are too great to permit an exclusive
focus on,the bilateral relationship.
It is not for me on this occasion to predict the results of bilateral
initiatives or the date and outcome of multilateral negotiations. It is
clear, hQwever, that our two governments have set themselves upon an
excitingiroad which has been traveled before in the long history between
us. The priority which both governments attach to strengthening and
deepening the bilateral relationship in all fields is recorded in the results
of the Quebec meeting. In trade, the options for bringing a new regime
to the rules and conditions which govern the most important trading relationship in the world offer a new future. These are interesting times.

